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The proliferation of elections in even those states that are arguably anything but democratic has given rise to
a focused interest on developing methods for detecting fraud in the official statistics of a state’s election
returns. Among these efforts are those that employ Benford’s Law, with the most common application being
an attempt to proclaim some election or another fraud free or replete with fraud. This essay, however, argues
that, despite its apparent utility in looking at other phenomena, Benford’s Law is problematical at best as
a forensic tool when applied to elections. Looking at simulations designed to model both fair and fraudulent
contests as well as data drawn from elections we know, on the basis of other investigations, were either
permeated by fraud or unlikely to have experienced any measurable malfeasance, we find that conformity with
and deviations from Benford’s Law follow no pattern. It is not simply that the Law occasionally judges
a fraudulent election fair or a fair election fraudulent. Its ‘‘success rate’’ either way is essentially equivalent to
a toss of a coin, thereby rendering it problematical at best as a forensic tool and wholly misleading at worst.
1 Introduction
Accusations of fraud and electoral skullduggery seem an ever-present component of democratic
process. Although things may have not changed much historically, today at least regardless of
whether voting concerns Florida or Tehran, Ohio or Kyiv, South Carolina or Moscow, the winners
rejoice, whereas the losers claim foul. And with even the most corrupt and autocratic regimes seeking the
mantra of democratic legitimacy, it seems as if election observer is now a full-time job. The difficulty,
though, with achieving a conclusive assessment of an election on the basis of direct observation is that
regimes can, as Russia’s did in 2008, erect formidable administrative barriers that render any objective
and viable oversight an impossibility; or, as occurred in Ukraine in 2004, both sides of a conflict can field
their own cadre of observers asserting or denying fraud, whereas the rest of us are left to debate who to
believe. Indeed, with observers subject to the accusation that they operate with political agendas beyond
encouraging free and fair elections, we can appreciate the necessity for developing statistical tools and
indicators that when applied to official returns, both augment the findings and conclusions of first-hand
observation and guide further investigations into an election’s legitimacy.
The search for objective methods using the data provided by a state’s election commission began,
perhaps, with the late Sobyanin and Suchovolsky’s (1993) analysis of Russia’s 1993 parliamentary
elections and constitutional referendum. But although several of the indicators of fraud he proposed have
subsequently been refined and extended as valuable tools, one indicator in particular reveals the dangers
of this enterprise. Here Sobyanin took note of an empirical relationship that pertains to an interestingly
wide range of phenomena. Specifically, suppose we take the variable X, where Xi measures the population
of city i, the sales of corporation i, the energy of subatomic particle i, or even the population of insect
species i, suppose X1 > X2 > . . . > Xn, and suppose we graph log(Xi) against the rank i. Then for the
variables cited, the necessarily negatively sloped relationship is nearly perfectly approximated by
a straight line. Applying this idea to the absolute votes won by the several parties in Russia’s 1993
proportional representation parliamentary elections held alongside its constitutional referendum,
Sobyanin interpreted the deviations from a linear relationship as an indicator of fraud’s magnitude.
The problems here should be obvious. If voters are sophisticated and strategic and if parties must
meet some threshold of representation, then we can anticipate a nonlinear drop in the vote shares of
parties that are not expected to win seats. Similarly, if Duverger’s law holds in single mandate contests,
then an even more pronounced discontinuity in shares will appear among all parties that rank third or
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lower. Indeed, it is precisely relationships of this type that Cox (1997) formally generalizes for a range
of electoral systems, which is to say that there are good theoretical reasons for supposing that a log-linear
relationship will not hold in a free and fair election. The search for a readily applied indicator of fraud did
not, of course, end with Sobyanin, and the quest for an easily applied forensic tool with the attendant
statistical and mathematical rigor is part of the attraction of recent applications of Benford’s Law to
elections. However, here we argue that this ‘‘law’’ is no less suspect as a means for detecting electoral
fraud than is Sobyanin’s adaptation of the log-rank model.
We emphasize the importance of not only finding appropriate statistical tools for detecting and
measuring fraud but also, from the perspective of the discipline as a whole, the importance of getting
it right wherein our research is set on a sound theoretical foundation. Again, if we judge things by the
proliferation of Web sites and Internet blogs, the application of Benford’s Law to elections is now an
important part of political science’s public face. Unfortunately, the ‘‘research’’ offered is anything but
peer reviewed. This essay, then, can be interpreted as an assessment of the conclusions that might apply
were peer review a part of this component of the discipline’s public persona. We begin in the next section,
then, with a brief review of Benford’s Law and a discussion of the need for theory linking it to elections and
electoral fraud. In Section 3, we turn to some simulations wherein we evaluate the Law’s performance
when applied to artificial data generated in accordance with the standard spatial model of party
competition in which fraud is wholly absent followed by an assessment of the Law’s value when votes
are transferred fraudulently from one candidate to the other in this artificial data. This section, then, can be
interpreted as an assessment of the Law’s propensity, in the abstract, to commit Type 1 and Type 2 errors,
respectively—to signal fraud when there is none and to signal a free and fair vote when there is fraud.
However, rather than rely exclusively on artificial data, in Sections 4 and 5, we apply the Law to data from
Ukraine’s 2004 presidential vote and its 2007 parliamentary contest. We emphasize that the choice of
Ukraine and of these two elections is not a mere convenience. For reasons we elaborate later, both
elections constitute a virtually perfect controlled social science experiment for assessing indicators of
electoral malfeasance. This analysis of Ukraine is then followed, in Section 6, with an assessment of
Russia’s most recent presidential contest in 2008. The utility of using this data for assessing Benford’s
Law is that we have good priors as towhere fraud is most likely to have occurred and where it is likely to be
absent of at least muted.
2 Benford’s Law
Briefly, Benford’s Law states (or, rather, observes) that a number of processes or measurements give rise to
numbers (e.g., returns on investment, population of cities, street addresses, sales of corporations, heights of
buildings) that establish patterns in the digits that might otherwise seem counterintuitive wherein lower
digits are more common than larger ones. Although we might expect digits to be uniformly (randomly)
distributed when there is no hidden nefarious hand generating the numbers that contain them, suppose, for
the simplest example, that we invest $100 and that our investment doubles every year. If we now record the
value of that investment everymonth, our first 12 observations will begin with the digit ‘‘1,’’ our next seven
with the digit ‘‘2,’’ our next four with the digit ‘‘3,’’ and so on. Thus, a graph of the distribution of first
digits will look like a log-normal density. Alternatively, if we collect home street numbers at random from
a telephone book because nearly all streets begin with the number ‘‘1’’ (or 10 or 100) and since
renumbering will occur when a street crosses a municipal boundary or simply ends before numbers
beginning with higher digits appear, addresses will more often begin with a ‘‘1’’ than a ‘‘2,’’ more often
with a ‘‘2’’ than a ‘‘3’’ and so on.
The processes in these examples that give rise to sequences of first digits that approximate Benford’s
Law are self-evident and statistically significant deviations from it can be taken as evidence that someone
has ‘‘cooked the books’’ or employed an unusual algorithm for numbering residences. Not a little effort
has been devoted, then, to formalizing that law mathematically and uncovering less obvious and more
general mechanisms of number generation that would yield conformity to it in other contexts (Janvresse
and la Rue 2004). Formally, Benford’s Law can be expressed thus: The probability that the digit d (d5 0,
1, . . ., 9) arises in the nth (n > 1) position is
P10n21
k5 10n22
log10

11 1
10k1d

:
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Thus, for processes thought to match Benford’s Law, Table 1 gives the predicted frequencies for both
the first and second digits (referred to as the 1BL and 2BL models):
In the realm of election forensics, it is these predictions that we see widely applied on a variety of Web
sites when the author wishes to argue the some election was free or fraudulent. Of course, the Web is
hardly the place to judge an indicator’s veracity since the authors of those sites often have political
agendas that render any conclusion suspect. On the other hand, we can assume that those analyses take
their inspiration from a more academic literature that attempts to rest the application of Benford’s Law to
elections on a more scientific footing (see especially Mebane 2006, 2007, 2008, Mebane and Kalinin
2009, Buttorf 2008). It is this literature that we address here.
First, though, we should note that for wholly plausible reasons, Mebane (2009) argues for
abandoning any focus on the first digit of election data. The argument, in its simplest form, is perhaps
best illustrated by Brady’s (2005) observation that if a competitive two candidate race occurs in districts
whose magnitude varies between 100 and 1000, the modal first digit for each candidate’s vote will not be 1
or 2 but rather 4, 5, or 6. This example, though, also points to a general problem with applications of 2BL
to elections, namely there does not yet exist any model—any theory—that compels us to believe that
manipulated vote tallies lead us away from the predictions of the Law and that a free and fair vote yields
data consistent with a 2BL distribution. Correspondingly, there is little in the way of analysis and theory to
tell what parameters we need to assess in determining the Law’s relevance or irrelevance.
Two examples illustrate what we mean here. The first, which we can discuss only briefly owing to
its technical nature, is the analysis by Ijiri and Simon (1977) of the linear log-rank relationship applied to
firm size—the same relationship Sobyanin sought to adapt to elections. Observing that a linear
relationship appears to hold empirically in this specific context, Ijiri and Simon propose a formal model
of investment and acquisition that predicts a relationship that approximately conforms to the log-rank
hypothesis. Their model, though, does more than that. First, rather than a strictly linear relationship,
it predicts a modestly concave one and the fact that the data precisely matches that deviation from a strictly
linear fit gives credence to their assumptions. But second and more importantly, the precise nature of those
assumptions in combination with their substantive interpretations, the things (e.g., government
intervention and regulation) that would occasion deviations from the predicted concave relationship.
A second example illustrates a less formal type of theory we deem essential for evaluating any
proposed forensic indicator of fraud. We refer here to the argument of Berber and Scacco (2008) for the
relevance of looking at the last and next to last digits of vote tallies. They begin by noting that if there is
little chance that the perpetrators of fraud fear prosecution even if detected (as is the case in contemporary
Russia), it is not unreasonable to be suspicious of precinct or regional tallies that report a proportion of
zeros and fives as the last digit in excess of what we expect by chance. Their ‘‘theory’’ here is simply the
supposition that absent any legal disincentives for committing fraud, precinct and local election officials
can meet their ‘‘quotas’’ and save effort by employing the simple heuristic of rounding off the numbers
they report, presumably without regard to actual ballots cast. Indeed, it is precisely rounding of this sort
that one finds in abundance in the turnout numbers of Russia’s 2004 and 2008 presidential elections
(Buzin and Lubarev 2008). And here we are reminded of the unintentionally humorous remark of
Vladimir Shevchuk of Tatarstan’s central election commission when commenting on Russia’s 2000
presidential election that elevated Putin to prominence: ‘‘there has been fraud of course, but some of
it may be due to the inefficient mechanism used to count ballots . . . To do it the right way they would
have needed more than one night. They were already dead tired so they did it in an expedient way’’
(Moscow Times, September 9, 2000). Berber and Scacco, though, also confront the possibility that fraud’s
perpetrators will seek to disguise their actions, and here they note that if perpetrators attempt to do so by
entering what they regard as random (but nevertheless, manipulated) numbers in official tallies, there is
a considerable body of experimental evidence in behavioral economics to suggest (as a parallel to the
Table 1 Benford Law frequencies
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
First digit — 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046 3.441
Second digit 0.120 0.114 0.109 0.104 0.100 0.097 0.093 0.090 0.088 0.085 4.187
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gambler’s fallacy) they will write repeated digits less frequently than what we expect by chance (Camerer
2003). That is, protocol entries ending with the digits ‘‘00,’’ ‘‘11,’’ ‘‘22,’’ and so on should, in a fraud free
election, occur a tenth of the time, and it is reasonable to be suspicious of protocols if observed
frequencies are significantly less than this fraction (for the application of this test to a suspect election
see Levin et al. 2009).
There are, of course, reasons for not relying exclusively on Berber and Scacco’s proposed indicators.
Among other things, we do not knowwhether we ought to look at vote totals for individual candidates or
turnout figures.Also,we have nohypotheses to guide us if an analysis of digits yields one inferencewhen
looking at say candidate totals and the opposite inferencewhenwe examine turnout. Nevertheless, their
idea does point the way toward a fuller theoretical explication of an analysis of digits grounded in
alternative models of the heuristics people might follow when committing fraud in various contexts
and forms. Ijiri and Simon’s analysis, in turn, illustrates a more fully developed theory of a potential
indicator wherein specific hypotheses can be tested to explain deviations from some formally predicted
regularity.
In contrast, the relevance of Benford’s Law to elections and its connection to specific forms of fraud
await explication. The principle justification offered for its relevance rests on the finding that aggregates
of numbers generated from different and uncorrelated random processes will, in the limit, fit the Law
(Hill 1998; Janvresse and la Rue 2004). Mebane (2006), in turn, argues for its relevance by asserting that
votingderives fromasequenceofstochasticchoices—forwhomtovote,whether tovote,errors invoting,and
so on. Such verbal arguments, though, are a weak reed upon which to rest a test for democratic legitimacy.
Amongother things, it ignores the fact that fraud itself is often implemented in ahighly decentralizedwayby
local and regional officials, each using their own schemes, heuristics, and procedures—thereby adding yet
another stochastic element to the mix and, arguably, encouraging an even closer fit to the Law. The fact is,
unlikeBerberandScacco’sanalysisof lastandnext-to-lastdigitsor Ijiri andSimon’smodelofinvestmentand
acquisitions, there isnocorrespondingbehavioralor theoretical reason for supposing that the seconddigitsof
fraud free datawill look anydifferent fromdata drawn froman election permeatedwith instances of falsified
votes and protocols (a potential exception here is Diekmann’s (2010) experimental study of fraudulently
generated statistical data). It may be that simulations of data that fit 2BL can be perturbed by falsifications
ofa specificsort (Mebane2006),but that isno reason forbelieving that fraud freedata itselfwill correspond to
2BL.Nor does it tell uswhen fraudmightmove official data closer in linewithBenford’s Law. Indeed, aswe
show shortly with both real and simulated data, that is precisely what can occur.
Some proponents of Benford’s Law might argue that it should be employed only as one of several
forensic tools. But in addition to noting those innumerable internet blogs that consider ONLY
deviations from 1BL or 2BL (which is more a comment on the ‘‘scholarship’’ of those blogs than
the legitimacy of the Law), we also see the Law’s strongest proponents offering arguments that hint
at viewing it as a virtual magic black box: Witness the assertion that ‘‘. . . it does not require that we
have covariates to which we may reasonably assume the votes are related across political jurisdictions.
The method is based on tests of the distribution of the digits in reported vote counts, so all that is needed
are the vote counts themselves’’ (Mebane 2006, 1). The statement is technically correct in terms of how
the Law is applied andMebane does qualifies things by stating that analyses employing 2BLmight merely
be used to flag suspicious data and augment on the ground observation and vote recounts. Nevertheless,
any inference that the analysis of official returns can begin and end with Benford’s Law or that we can
dispense with measuring other variables such as the socioeconomic correlates of voting is unwarranted:
Detecting and measuring fraud is much like any criminal investigation and requires a careful gathering of
all available data and evidence in conjunction with a ‘‘theory of the crime’’ that takes into account
substantive knowledge of the election being considered, including the geographic correlates of voting,
the motives for committing fraud (which themselves might correlate with other observable variables), and
the instruments at the disposal of those intent of falsifying the vote. In an ideal world, a ‘‘theory of the
crime’’ in combination with this additional data would then be used, in combination with a theory relating
the Law to free and fair elections, to ascertain its relevance and the deviations from it that might arise for
wholly innocuous reasons. However, absent a clearly specified theory of how Benford’s Law applies to
election data—formal or otherwise—it is unclear how to make it a part of any ‘‘criminal investigation.’’
Indeed, the argument that follows is that as presently developed, the Law is suspect at best if not irrelevant
as a forensic indicator: Deviations from it are as likely to signal fraud when there is none as it is to fail to
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signal fraud when it in fact exists. Our argument here, then, is that Benford’s Law gives an unacceptably
high chance of committing both Type 1 and Type 2 errors.
3 Simulations
Absent a theory that links Benford’s Law to elections and specific models of fraud, there are
essentially two ways to assess its value as an indicator: Simulations and its application to elections
in which we are confident, a priori, that there was or was not significant fraud. Turning first, then, to
simulation, the difficulty here is that unless the simulations are themselves grounded in some well-defined
paradigm or conceptualization of elections, we cannot preclude the possibility of inadvertently selecting
a structure that is somehow biased for or against a positive evaluation of things. This is all the more
problematic here since, to repeat ourselves, the assumptions justifying the relevance of Benford’s
Law to elections remain unspecified—there is no proscribed model of an election with which to begin
the generation of artificial data. Our approach then is to begin with what is perhaps the most widely used
formal conceptualization of an election—the spatial model wherein voters are identified by ideal points in
an Euclidean ‘‘issue’’ space, candidates take positions in that space, and voters vote (or abstain) for the
candidate closest to their idea.
To simulate the data of a fraud-free election, we appreciate that there are a great many ways to proceed.
We wish here, though, to proceed with as few assumptions as possible in order to insure a homogeneous
electorate that yields a final vote count favoring one candidate or the other only because of the candidate’s
relative electoral strategies—in our case, their spatial positions relative to the electorate. We begin then
with the usual Downsian model of an electorate in which eligible voters occupy positions in a two-
dimensional space, where, if they vote, they do so for the candidate closest to their ideal position.
The positions of the candidates—point in that policy space—are then exogenously set to induce simulated
elections of different degrees of competitiveness. Keep in mind, now, that aside from district size and the
expected division of the vote between the candidates, the absolute values of several parameters (i.e.,
sseveral means and variances) hold no substantive meaning since spatial dimensions have no natural met-
ric associated with them. Thus, to induce random and homogeneous preferences and turnout distributions,
we formalize the spatial structure of our simulations by letting, for each voter i,
Xi5 bXVi1uxi
Yi5 bYVi1uYi
Ti5 bTVi1uTi
where Vi N(g, 2) and g N(G, 0.15), where G5 2 for Xi and Yi, where Xi is the voter i’s X position, Yi is
i’s Y position, Ti is i’s ‘‘voting coefficient’’ (i.e., if Ti > some fixed T*, i votes, otherwise i abstains), and
where bX and bY vary between districts such that bXN(2, 0.15) and bYN(21, 0.15). The parameters bT
and G are fixed exogenously at 4 for turnout and T* 5 15 so that turnout varies between 40% and 60%
across districts. Finally, the variable u is a noise term, such that u  N(0, 2.0).1
The motivation for this structure is as follows: Suppose G denotes the mean personal incomes of the
voting age population nationally. Thus, although we fix the national average, the mean income of each
district, g, is drawn randomly from the distribution N(G, 0.15). Voter i’s income, then, is a draw from the
distribution N(g, 2.0). However, to accommodate the possibility that income impacts policy preferences
differentially across districts owing to unobserved variables, we let bx be its ‘‘impact’’ in i’s district. The
randomly selected voter in question, i, will have the income Vi drawn from a distribution that corresponds
to his or her district, N(g, 0.15). The impact of that income on his or her position on issue X is then taken to
1We note again that the various mean and variance parameter values of 2, 0.15, and –1 merely dictate the spread of ideal points and
thus dictate the positions of the candidates we must choose to achieve specific splits in the candidates’ vote shares. They do not, of
themselves, determine second-digit frequencies. Moreover, in this model, turnout is not a function of candidate positions, second-
digit frequencies are also invariant with the specifics of those positions except insofar as they determine vote shares.
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be Vi times bX, to which we add an additional random component so as to, in effect, spread voters out on
issue X (note that the means of bX and bYare different, set at 2 and –1, respectively, to allow for differential
salience of the underlying social determinants of policy preferences on the two issues . . . which, in effect,
ensures that our two-dimensional distribution of ideal points will not be radially symmetric).2
The parameters of interest now are district size and the winning candidate’s margin of victory.3 Our
simulations, though, consist of two types. In the first type, we simulate an election by creating 1000
districts wherein each contains the same fixed number of eligible voters. Here we run several sequences
of elections where every district contains 1000 eligible voters, elections where every district contains
10,000 voters, and elections where every district contains 20,000 voters. With respect to these numbers,
we note that in the real world, we are generally at the mercy of election commissions and the level of
aggregation with which they report data. For example, for data from places such as Russia and Ukraine, if
it is available at the precinct level, we can access data in which the average number of eligible voters per
observation equals 1000 (and, if we delete special districts, will typically vary between 200 and 2500
eligible voters). A similar variation is observed in most American states, whereas in Taiwan, precincts
rarely exceed 500 eligible voters. On the other hand, the data available to us are often more highly
aggregated and can range in size from 10,000 eligible voters on up to the adult population of entire
provinces. Naturally, ‘‘too great’’ a level of aggregation undermines any hope of statistical reliability
(e.g., if, in Ukraine, we are compelled to rely on formally defined election district data, we have at most
255 observations with virtually no opportunity to control for those things we can reasonably assume
correlate with the likelihood of fraud such as percent urban (for a discussion of this issue in the Russian
case, which applies to Ukraine as well, see Berezkin et al. 1999, 2003). And ‘‘too low’’ a level of
aggregation, wherein the number of eligible voters per observation vary between, say, 1 and 500,
confounds even 2BL since the second digit can be the last or next to last. In this case, if Berber and
Scacco’s (2008) hypothesis as to how fraud can impact last and next to last digits, we must assume that
fraud will impact the fit with 2BL in unknown ways. Given these considerations, then, we let the size of
‘‘precincts’’ in our simulations take one of three values—1000, 10,000, or 20,000—with the assumption
that if we are compelled to rely on observations that average more than 20,000 eligible voters, the level of
aggregation is likely to be too great for a confident assessment of things using any methodology.
Our second series of simulations takes cognizance of the fact that precincts are rarely if ever of the same
size and rarely is the distribution of sizes uniform or even normal. For example, for the two empirical
cases, we examine in detail later—Ukraine and Russia—precincts vary generally between 100 and 2500
eligible voters, where precincts between, say, 100 and 500 eligible voters far outnumber those with
between 500 and 1000 and precincts with between 500 and 1000 eligible voters are more common that
those with between 1000 and 2500. In this second series of simulations, then, we allow the size of districts
to be randomly distributed around means of 1000, 10,000, or 20,000, where each district is similar in the
characteristics of the population, but where smaller districts are more common than larger ones.
Specifically, we let the size of each district, Sd, be generated by the function,
Pd5 0:75m1ed;
where Sd is the number of eligible voters in the district, m is the mean district size, and ed is an
exponentially distributed random variable with mean 0.25 m.
Our second parameter, now, is the vote share of the winning candidate in a two-candidate contest. Here
we let that share assume one of three values: 52%, 57%, and 66%. Both sets of simulations are then divided
into two halves. The first half calculates the mean value of the second digit for both candidates using the
data generated by the process just described. Data of this sort, though, allow us only to assess the
2The software employed in these simulations along with instructions for their implementation are available upon request.
3We report here on a total of 136 simulated elections with each set of parameter values simulated several times. Because of the high
number of voters and districts, each simulation run takes a significant amount of computing time and running more simulations than
already included would require a significant cost in terms of computer time at a negligible benefit in terms of increased confidence
levels. However, the degrees of freedom when testing the second-digit mean in these simulations is derived from the number of
districts in each election, which is 1000 in every case. Thus, we can achieve high levels of confidence about the second-digit mean in
each scenario without running more simulations. So although N5 136 may seem small for simulated data, we are actually working
with N 5 1000 for each of the statistical tests performed.
250 Joseph Deckert et al.
 at California Institute of Technology on N
ovem
ber 7, 2011
http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
hypothesis that 2BL can be used to identify a free and fair vote. To assess the opposite—the likelihood
that Benford’s Law will fail to signal detect fraud when it in fact exists requires that we introduce fraud of
some sort into the analysis. Manipulations of the vote can, of course, take a variety of forms, including
stuffed ballot boxes and stolen votes. To simplify things with a form that magnifies its effects, the second
half of our simulations takes our fraud-free data and transfers a percentage of the second (losing)
candidate’s vote in each district to the first (winning) candidate. In our simulations, the percentage
transferred varies across districts according to a uniform distribution between 0% and 30%. Thus,
the winning candidate on average gains 15% of the minority candidate’s vote.
The article’s Appendix offers a complete set of the second-digit means generated by our simulations,
including an accounting of statistical significance. Here we summarize that data from several
perspectives, concluding that 2BL gains no support as an indicator of fraud. Table 2 begins this summary
for the first half of our simulations—districts of fixed and uniform size—with an assessment of the extent
to which observed second digits differ significantly from the 2BL value of 4.187. Our data here are
organized by a three-way partition: size of districts (1k, 10k, and 20k), the candidates’ vote shares
(52–48, 55–45, and 66–34), and the majority versus minority candidate. Each cell of this table, in turn,
offers two numbers—the number of elections in which the mean value of the second digit is significantly
different from 4.187 at the .01 level of significance (p values < .01) and the number that are not significant
at this level. For example, then, with a 52/48 split in the vote and a district size of 10,000 eligible voters,
two simulations yield mean second digits significantly different from 4.187 and three do not.
There are hints here that 2BL performs better when districts are small and when the election is
competitive, but clearly 2BL is anything but a reliable indicator of a fraud free contest. Nearly 75%
of all observed second-digit means are significantly different than 4.187 at the .01 level of confidence.
And Table 3, which matches the format of Table 1, but now considers the corresponding simulations with
fraud, provides little or no reason to alter this conclusion. Indeed, the overall number of average second
digits significantly different from 4.187 drops from 80 to 72 despite the induced fraud. This is not to say
that there are no patterns in Table 3 that proponents of Benford’s Law might take in a positive light. For
example, when election districts are ‘‘small’’ (i.e., 1k or 10k), the number of observed means significantly
different than 4.187 for the majority candidate rises when moving from fair to fraudulent elections from 23
Table 2 Number of fraud–free elections with mean second–digit significantly different versus number not
significantly different than 4.187, constant district size
District size 52–48 55–45 66–34 Row summary
Majority candidate 1k 5/0 4/2 4/2 13/4
10k 2/3 3/3 5/1 10/7
20k 4/1 6/0 6/0 16/1
Minority candidate 1k 3/2 4/2 5/1 12/5
10k 3/2 5/1 6/0 14/3
20k 4/1 6/0 5/1 15/2
Column summary 21/9 28/8 31/5 80/22
Table 3 Number of fraudulent elections with mean second–digit significantly different versus number not
significantly different than 4.187, constant district size
District size 52–48 55–45 66–34 Row summary
Majority candidate 1k 5/0 6/0 6/0 17/0
10k 4/1 5/1 6/0 15/2
20k 3/2 4/2 1/5 8/9
Minority candidate 1k 5/0 6/0 0/6 11/6
10k 5/0 6/0 0/6 11/6
20k 4/1 3/3 3/3 10/7
Column summary 26/4 30/6 16/20 72/30
251Benford’s Law and the Detection of Election Fraud
 at California Institute of Technology on N
ovem
ber 7, 2011
http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
to 32 (of 34 elections). It is when we turn to larger districts (20k) that 2BL becomes wholly unsatisfactory:
although 31 of 34 means (summing across both candidates) are significantly different from 4.187 in our
fraud-free simulations, only 18 are thus different in our fraudulent simulations. In fact, if we limit our
focus to relatively close contests (52–48 and 55–45), 2BL hardly distinguishes between fraud free and
fraudulent: 49 of 66means are significantly different from 4.187 in the fraud-free simulations, wherein this
number increases to only 56 in the fraud simulations.
Of course, one can also ask if fraud at least moves the calculation of second-digit means in the
‘‘right’’ direction—ignoring tests of statistical significance (and in fact, as our Appendix shows, most
changes are not significant) what share of means move further from 4.187 when fraud is introduced into
our simulations? Table 4 answers this question where the first number in each cell corresponds to the
number of means that move further from 4.187 and the second corresponds to the number that more closer
to 4.187 with the introduction of fraud. For example, then, with a 52/48 split in the vote and districts each
with 10,000 eligible voters, one simulation moves the calculated second-digit mean away from 4.187 in
absolute terms, whereas 4 simulations move it closer.
Table 4 reveals that 2BL’s performance is appreciably better by this measure in close elections than
in landslide victories. When the majority candidate wins but 52% of the vote, fraud moves the
calculation of mean second digits closer to 4.187 in only 7 of 30 cases, whereas when the election is
a 66%–34% landslide, fraud has the opposite effect on mean second digits. Nevertheless, the introduction
of fraud across all our simulations here actually moves the mean value of second digits closer to 4.187 in
a majority of cases (57 vs. 45). Of course, one might object to this assessment with the argument that
requiring districts of equal size biases our numbers away from 2BL’s value—that our simulations contain
‘‘too much normality’’ for Benford’s Law to apply. Table 5, then, reproduces Table 2, except than now we
consider those simulations with variable district sizes—elections in which the sizes of districts are
distributed exponentially. And, in fact, 2BL does less poorly here than with constant district sizes.
Generally, although 80 of 102 (slightly less than 80%) calculated means are significantly different than
4.187 with constant district sizes, that number drops to 57 of 170 calculated means (or approximately
35%).
Labeling 35% of fraud-free elections as fraudulent is hardly the sought after characteristic we seek in
a forensic indicator and is not one likely to carry much weight in the world of public opinion. Nevertheless,
continuing with our assessment of things and examining the consequences of the introduction of fraud into
our simulations here, Table 6 parallels Table 3 in its construction. For various cells here, 2BL appears to
perform well. For example, with a 55 to 45 split in the vote and an average district size of 10k, 12 of 15
calculated means are significantly different from 4.187. But as good as this number might seem to pro-
ponents of Benford’s Law, notice that if we turn to the losing candidate, ALL calculated second-digit
means fail to differ significantly from 4.187. And overall, only 68 of 180 means depart significantly from
4.187. Thus, 102 of 170 simulated results give thewrong inference—the inference of a free and fair contest
despite the fact that fully 15% of the losing candidate’s vote has been transferred to the winning opponent.
With exponentially distributed districts, then, Benford’s Law can be said to commit the Type 1 error of
incorrectly labeling a free and fair vote as fraudulent 34% of the time and the Type 2 error of labeling
a fraudulent election as free and fair 60% of the time.
Table 4 Number of elections with mean second–digit moving away from versus number moving toward 4.187, with
the introduction of fraud, constant district size
District size 52–48 55–45 66–34 Row summary
Majority candidate 1k 0/5 1/5 4/2 5/12
10k 1/4 2/4 5/1 8/9
20k 1/4 5/1 6/0 12/5
Minority candidate 1k 2/3 2/4 6/0 10/7
10k 1/4 3/3 6/0 10/7
20k 2/3 5/1 5/1 12/5
Column summary 7/23 18/18 32/4 57/45
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None of this is to say that there might not be another simulated model of elections that would yield
a better fit to 2BL nor can we preclude the possibility that there are forms of fraud other than the one we
implement here wherein 2BL might perform better. Unfortunately, it is here that the absence of any well-
defined theory connecting Benford’s Law to elections undermines its relevance. With such a theory, we
would know, as Ijiri and Simon illustrate with and explicit model linking firm size to a log-rank
relationship, the magnitude of deviations from 4.187 that should concern us, the forms of fraud if
any 2BL is likely to detect, and how its performance is impacted by such things as the election law,
the presence or absence of strategic voting, and the number of competing parties or candidates. But absent
a theoretical derivation of the law in an electoral context and absent an exploration of a potential infinity
of alternative simulations and formalizations of fraud within them, proponents of Benford’s Law ought
minimally to be concerned that it does not appear to give reliable information when applied to data
generated by a quite standard two-candidate spatial model and a rather straightforward formalization
of fraud.
4 Ukraine 2004
Simulations provide but one basis for evaluating a quasi-theoretical idea; real-world data are a second
venue that needs to be explored. And here there is perhaps no better source of data with which to evaluate
an indicator of fraud than Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election. Pitting two candidates, a Western-leaning
Viktor Yushchenko against the pro-Russian Putin-backed Viktor Yanukovich (along with a variety of
uncompetitive candidates), that election is as close to a controlled experiment as we are likely to find
in the social sciences. Briefly, few plans were implemented for electoral skullduggery in the election’s
first (October) round since it was universally understood that no candidate would pass the 50% threshold
and that the two Viktors would compete against each other in a (November) runoff for a politically and
geographically divided electorate. And in conformity with public opinion polls, Yushchenko was
officially credited with 39.90% of the vote, Yanukovich garnered 39.26%, and no other candidate
won more than 6%. The November runoff was an altogether different story. Ukraine’s Central Election
Commission proclaimed Yanukovich the winner, awarding him 49.46% of the vote as compared to
Table 5 Number of fraud–free elections with mean second–digit significantly different versus number not
significantly different than 4.187, exponentially distributed district sizes
District size 52–48 55–45 66–34 Row summary
Majority candidate 1k 4/6 9/6 8/2 21/14
10k 6/4 9/6 7/3 22/13
20k 1/4 1/4 0/5 2/13
Minority candidate 1k 2/8 0/15 3/7 5/30
10k 2/8 1/14 1/9 4/31
20k 1/4 1/4 1/4 3/12
Column summary 16/34 21/49 20/30 57/113
Table 6 Number of fraudulent elections with mean second–digit significantly different versus number not
significantly different than 4.187, exponentially distributed district sizes
District size 52–48 55–45 66–34 Row summary
Majority candidate 1k 5/5 11/4 8/2 24/11
10k 8/2 12/3 7/3 27/8
20k 1/4 2/3 0/5 3/12
Minority candidate 1k 0/10 1/14 6/4 7/28
10k 1/9 0/15 4/6 5/30
20k 1/4 0/5 1/4 2/13
Column summary 26/4 30/6 16/20 68/102
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Yushchenko’s 46.61% (a 1.2 million vote plurality), but the balloting was marred by any number of ir-
regularities, including turnout rates in excess of 100% in Yanukovich’s strongholds, university students
claiming they were not allowed to mark their ballots except for Yanukovich, and precinct administrators
who testified to their own stratagems for manipulating the vote on Yanukovich’s behalf. Nearly
immediately, upwards of a half million people took to the streets of Kyiv in a protest termed the Orange
Revolution, demanding that Ukraine’s Supreme Court invalidate the vote and require a second runoff.
And here the critical piece of evidence the court could not ignore when it ruled the November vote invalid
came, interestingly, from the offices of Yanukovich’s primary sponsor, then incumbent President Leonid
Kuchma. To allow the presidential administration to monitor the vote as the returns came in, a dual
computer system was established whereby returns were sent simultaneously to the President’s office
as well as to Ukraine’s Central Election Commission. However, as the person in charge of the President’s
half of that system, Chief Consultant to the Administration of the President Lyudmyla Hrebenyuk,
testified, in mid-afternoon when trends indicated a victory for Yushchenko, 1.1 million votes mysteriously
appeared for Yanukovich in the CEC’s public accounting that did not register on the President’s
computers. Put simply, in addition to the countless instances of fraud in the form of coercion and
manipulations at the local and precinct levels, the CEC simply manufactured over a million votes
out of thin air in favor of Yanukovich with the documentary evidence of their actions in the files and
computer hard drives of the President’s office.4
Following Ms Hrebenyuk’s testimony, with the Orange Revolution in full swing and with virtually all
Western governments refusing to recognize the November result, the Supreme Court required a rerun of
the runoff in December. At that point, a greatly embarrassed Putin withdrew his spin doctors from Kyiv,
the composition of the CEC was reconstituted and countless members of Ukraine’s diaspora poured into
the country to monitor the second runoff—this time stationing themselves in those districts that had
earlier produced the most evidently suspicious numbers. At the same time President Kuchma, no longer
certain that he was in control of his country’s varied security forces, signaled his neutrality and thereby
freed regional political bosses and administrators from any obligation to manipulate the vote. The net
effect of all this was to present students of election fraud with a nearly perfect social science experiment:
A November vote that in an unambiguous way saw something between 5 and 10% of the vote falsified in
favor of one specific candidate, followed by a second vote with the same two candidates, the same issues
and the same voters but with the opportunities and incentives to engage in fraud greatly reduced if not
wholly eliminated. Unsurprisingly, turnout in districts that had reported rates in excess of 100% in
November saw their numbers drop to a more reasonable 70%–80%, both official and unofficial observers
reported few if any irregularities and, in conformity with pre-election and exit polls, Yushchenko won the
runoff 51.99% versus 44.20%.
It is these two votes that we and others use to assess the performance of a variety of indicators of
fraud other than 2BL—distributions of turnout, the relationship between turnout and each candidate’s
share of the eligible electorate, econometric estimates of the flow of votes between elections, and the
analysis of last and next-to-last digits. Here we note simply that all such indicators, in addition to having
a formally well-defined link to detecting election fraud in the form of the non-homogeneities in the data
occasioned by stolen votes, fictitious vote counts, and outright ballot box stuffing, are consistent with the
hypothesis that the November balloting saw between 1.5 and 3 million suspect or explicitly fraudulent
votes whereas there is essentially no evidence of fraud in the December runoff (Myagkov et al. 2009). The
question, then, is: What does 2BL tell us?
Taking official returns from Ukraine’s 755 rayons (counties), if we look first at the numbers
reported for the candidates, we find a mean value of 4.21 for both the first and second rounds in
Yushchenko’s votes, whereas the means for Yanukovich are 4.37 in the first (November) runoff and
4.28 in the December re-vote. Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that none of the November fraud
impacted Yushchenko’s vote and that the difference of 0.09 signals a less fraudulent second runoff on
Yanukovich’s behalf. However, we should keep in mind that Benford’s Law does not tell us what numbers
should be analyzed and that half or more of the fraud in November took the form of artificially inflated
4This evidence merely confirms what two of this essay’s authors were told before the October vote by a Putin advisors sent to Kyiv to
facilitate Yanukovich’s campaign, namely that ‘‘if necessary we can fudge 3% of the vote; 10% would be more difficult.’’
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turnout—literally stuffed ballot boxes and falsified protocols—wherein no less than 1.5 million
nonexistent voters were added to the count. A second-digit analysis of official turnout figures, though,
would seem to contest this fact: The mean second-digit in the first runoff is 4.22 and increases to 4.39 in
the December vote. In other words, if we draw any inferences at all from 2BL it is, contrary to all that we
know about the election and despite all documented evidence to the contrary, the December re-runoff was
more likely to be fraudulent than the November vote.
One might be tempted, of course, in defense of Benford’s Law, to argue that the mean values just
reported are sufficiently close to the 4.187 value dictated by 2BL so as to be, at worst, inconclusive
and requiring additional analysis. As we well know, however, mean values near 4.187 can arise from
any number of distributions, and thus, a graph of second-digit frequencies is perhaps more telling than
a simple summary statistic. And, in fact, these frequencies reveal very little in the way of meaningful
patterns or patterns that suggest any relevance of Benford’s Law one way or the other. Figure 1a graphs
Yushchenko’s second and third-round second-digit distributions, Fig. 1b does the same for Yanukovich,
and Fig. 1c does so for turnout across all election districts. Although it is true that ‘‘0’’ is the most
frequently observed second digit for Yushchenko in the second round (and nearly so in the third),
the next two most frequently observed digits are ‘‘4’’ and ‘‘5.’’ Yanukovich’s third-round pattern does
fit 2BL. But for turnout, despite the well-documented fraud that occurred, it is the second round and not
the third that seems to fit 2BL best wherein the numbers ‘‘0,’’ ‘‘1,’’ and ‘‘2’’ are most common in the
Fig. 1 (a) Yushchenko second-digit distribution, Ukraine 2004. (b) Yanukovich second-digit distribution, Ukraine
2004. (c) Turnout second-digit distribution, Ukraine 2004.
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second round, but ‘‘4’’, ‘‘5,’’ and ‘‘6’’ capture that honor in the third. In fact, detecting meaningful patterns
in any of these distributions seems akin to seeing cats, dogs, and cows in clouds.
5 Ukraine 2007
If Ukraine’s 2004, presidential election was the near-perfect social science experiment, the country’s
2007 parliamentary vote is perhaps an even better basis for evaluating a forensic tool. Here we not only
know of the existence of fraud, we also know its approximate magnitude and precise form. Although the
election received high marks from international observers for meeting the standards of free and fair, one
region nevertheless fell under suspicion—Donetsk, which is Yanukovich’s home region and the center of
support of his party, The Party of Regions. By way of understanding the motives for fraud, we note that
following the 2006 parliamentary vote, Yanukovich resurrected himself as head of Regions to become
Prime Minister by forming a coalition government with the Communists and Oskar Moroz’s Socialists.
And although the Communists were Yanukovich’s natural allies, the participation of the Socialists in his
coalition came as a rude shock to Yanukovich’s opponents since Moroz had thrown in his lot with the
Orange Coalition in 2004. However, opposed to Yushchenko’s goal of securing NATO membership and
denied the lucrative post of Speaker of the Parliament, Moroz performed an about face and, accepting the
label ‘traitor’ in Western Ukraine, sided with Yanukovich.
Moroz’s switch in allegiance and Yanukovich’s subsequent ability to thwart Yushchenko’s agenda
led the President to dissolve parliament and call for new elections in 2007 with well-defined strategies
for the competing sides. For Yushchenko is was to maintain one’s support in the West, pick up those
voters who had previously supported Moroz, and pursue incremental gains in the East. Yanukovich’s
strategy was equally clear: Hold onto one’s traditional support, do nothing to undermine the Com-
munists, and facilitate Moroz’s campaign in the East. Most critically, Yanukovich’s ability to remain
Prime Minister hinged on whether Moroz’s Socialists would exceed the 3% threshold for represen-
tation which at a minimum was worth 15 of 450 parliamentary seats. The chances of sustaining his
coalition, then, depended on whether the Socialists could make up in the East the losses they were
certain to incur in Western Ukraine. However, as the votes were counted it became evident that the
Socialists would fall short of the mark—that voters who might have approved of the Socialist’s switch to
Yanukovich preferred nevertheless to cast their ballots for either the Communists or Regions. Put simply,
voters were rational: A vote for the Socialists was an uncertain option. Although a vote for them signaled
support for Yanukovich, if the party failed to pass the threshold for representation, the votewas wasted. For
thosewho supported Yanukovich and his coalition, then, it was better to cast one’s ballot for Regions or the
Communists, both of which were certain to pass the threshold. It was at this point, in late afternoon, that
the flow of precinct vote counts from Donetsk suspiciously stopped and when they resumed they reported
an improbably high level of support for Moroz’s Socialists—in many instances, support that exceeded
Regions by factors of 5 and 10.
Subsequent analysis of the returns leave little doubt that, in the attempt to push the Socialists past the
3% threshold, rather than simply manufacture votes for the Socialists (and be caught red-handed, as in
2004, with reported turnout rates in excess of 100%), something between 100,000 and 160,000 votes were
simply subtracted in a subset of precincts in Donetsk from the totals reported for Regions and awarded to
the Socialists (Myagkov et al. 2009, 210–20). Put simply, in approximately 350 of Donetsk’s 2455 pre-
cincts, ballots marked for Regions were put in the Socialist pile. This tactic has a clear logic under PR:
Although the loss of even 160,000 votes might cost Regions a seat or two, the coalition would gain the 15
seats of the Socialists if the party inched past the threshold. This effort failed, of course, because Yanu-
kovich’s minions realized too late that voters in Eastern Ukraine were not offsetting the Socialist’s losses
in the West.5
For our purposes, we note that Regions officially won upwards of 1,718,600 votes in Donetsk,
whereas the Socialists were credited with a bit more than 190,000. Thus, the transferred votes constituted
5Although the media noted these discrepancies and even anticipated them, little was made officially of things by either side. Ya-
nukovich was hardly going to admit to fraud in his home region. Yushchenko’s coalition, on the other hand, actually gained a net of
two or three seats from the fraud—enough to form a new governing coalition that deposed Yanukovich as Prime Minister in favor of
Yulia Tymoshenko. Neither side, then, had any incentive to challenge the vote count in Donetsk.
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approximately 5%–10% of the support for Regions, but upwards of 80% of that for the Socialists. The
question, then, is whether Benford’s Law detects this fraud. More to the point, although we might expect
the returns for Regions in Donetsk to continue to match the predictions of 2BL since fraud impacted its
numbers only slightly and then only in a subset of precincts, we can hardly expect the same of the
Socialists. Interestingly, though, we find precisely the opposite. After eliminating precincts in which
a party wins fewer than 100 votes, the mean second digit for Regions is 3.66, whereas for the Socialists
it is 4.08. That is, the data for the Socialists better fit 2BL than does that for Regions.6 Thus, although
Benford’s Law suggests substantial fraud on behalf of Regions in Donetsk, it gives essentially a clean bill
of health to the Socialists, which we know it not the case. If we deem fraud on the order of 10% as
insignificant when compared to 80%, we might even say that in Donetsk, Benford’s Law commits both
Type 1 and Type 2 errors simultaneously—offering the incorrect inference of a free and fair vote in the
case of the Socialist tally and the inference of a fraudulent vote for the less perturbed tally of Regions.
6 Russia
A focus on data from Ukraine is valuable not only because it provides a nearly perfectly controlled
laboratory for the study of election fraud but also because fraud in 2004 and 2007 took two distinctive
and well-documented forms: Artificially inflated turnout in 2004 and, as in our simulations, the transfer of
votes from one party to another in 2007. But of the countries that provide definitive data with which to
assess Benford’s Law as a forensic tool, Russia ranks a close second to Ukraine. That fraud in various
forms permeated its 2004 and 2008 national elections is undisputed except by Putin apologists. For
example, despite the ongoing war in Chechnya, official turnout never fell below 90% since Putin’s
ascension to power (94.0% in 2004 and 91.0% in 2008) with nearly equivalent percentages of the vote
ostensibly cast in support of his regime (92.3% for Putin in 2004 and 88.7% for his anointed successor,
Medvedev in 2008). Such numbers would have us believe that the mujahideen descended from their
mountain hideaways disguised as babushkas to cast votes for a regime committed to killing them.
Alternatively, one can look to the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan who report levels of support
nearly as extreme as Chechnya7 and where we can readily find election districts (rayons) in which nearly
all precincts report turnout rates of 100% with 100% of the vote supporting Putin or Medvedev. Finally,
we have the Islamic Republic of Ingushetia (Chechnya’s neighbor), which in 2004, reported a turnout of
96.2% with Putin credited with an amazing 98.2% of the ballots cast. However, shortly after the election,
the Web site of dissident Magomed Yevloyev conducted a survey of the electorate (where respondents
were required to confirmed their answers by giving their internal passport numbers) in which roughly half
of those interviewed (n ffi 50,000) confirmed that they had not voted. Although such methodology can
hardly be taken as decisive evidence of fraud, we note that shortly thereafter, Yevloyev had the misfortune
of returning to Ingushetia on the same plane as the republic’s Kremlin-appointed president, whereupon he
was arrested and placed in handcuffs at the airport. Mysteriously (or rather, miraculously), the official
police report states that he freed himself on the drive to the capitol and, while wrestling for a gun,
succeeded in shooting himself several times in the head, only to then have his body fall from the car
as it proceeded on (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7590719.stm).
The advantages of looking at Russia as a test of any election forensic tool, though, does not derive
simply from knowing that fraud occurred. Rather, it lies in the fact that fraud is not uniformly
distributed across the country and we know where it is most prevalent on the basis of prior analyses,
first-hand testimony, and the logic of political opportunities and incentives. Insofar as those incentives are
concerned, with both political and economic control of the regions now centered in the Kremlin and with
Putin having dispensed with regional executive elections in favor of direct Kremlin appointment, regional
6One might conjecture that the lowmean for Regions derives from peculiarities in the size of precincts. That is true in a complex way.
If we isolate those 1841 smaller districts in which Regions’ vote lies between 100 and 1000, the mean second digit shoots up to 4.43
whereas for the remaining 530 larger precincts, its second-digit score drops to 1.00 (a comparable reanalysis for the Socialists
changes nothing since it secured 1000 or more votes in only 11 of the 353 districts in which it won more than 100 votes).
7In 2004, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan reported turnout of 83.0% and 89%, respectively, whereas in 2008 those numbers were little
changed at 83.0% and 90%. In 2004, Putin was awarded 86.55% and 91.8% of the vote in these two republics, respectively, whereas
Medvedev’s reported totals declined slightly to 79.2% and 88.0%.
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bosses are, in effect, caught in a game much like a Prisoners’ Dilemma with its dominant strategy:
Regardless of the actions of anyone else, each must not merely show fealty to the center but must,
as best they can, show no less support than the next boss. To act otherwise is to endanger one’s position
and even opens the door to criminal prosecution. Thus, for the same motives that the NKVD exceeded the
Kremlin’s targets by a factor of five for the killing of ‘‘kulaks’’ in 1937 (Snyder 2010), with everyone
knowing that no one is prosecuted for encouraging, facilitating or engaging in fraud, provided only that it
benefits the powers that be in Moscow, regional bosses have little incentive to ensure a free and fair vote
and every incentive to act otherwise.
Of course, regional bosses do not all enjoy the same authority in their domains: Some control all media,
whereas others do not; some control the industrial enterprises that dominate a region’s economy, whereas
others do not; some have held political control of their regions since before the fall of the Soviet Union,
whereas others are recent appointments, and some have an ideological predisposition to supporting Putin,
whereas others do not. The 2008 election also added an additional wrinkle that mediated the degree of
electoral support expected by the Kremlin. Although the Kremlin sought a landslide victory for Medvedev,
Putin arguably did not want his prote´ge´ to exceed the vote share he was awarded in 2004.8 Thus, Putin’s
numbers in 2004 set an upper bound for each region and to fall short of that target in any significant way in
2008 was likely to endanger a one’s position, whereas to exceed it would doubtlessly earn a reprimand.
We also have good ideas as to which bosses are best positioned to control the vote count, namely those
who control Russia’s ethnic republics—the ‘‘usual suspects’’ from the 1990’s on have consistently been
the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Mordovia.9 This is not to
say that fraud does not occur elsewhere, but its magnitude in the form of official tallies that bear little or no
relationship to actual ballots cast is unlikely to be exceeded in other regions.10 Put simply, any forensic
indicator that suggests that the above mentioned regions are not the prime suspects in fabricated vote
counts or that gives them a clean bill of health with respect to electoral fraud runs afoul of what we know
substantively about contemporary Russian politics. This, however, is precisely what 2BL would lead us to
believe.
Looking first at the precinct level returns for Medvedev in 2008 (since the vote counts for other can-
didates yield numbers that too infrequently entail more than two digits), and calculating the average of the
second digit by region, Figure 2 gives the overall distribution of second-digit averages across all of Rus-
sia’s regions (as before, we eliminate all precincts in which Medvedev receives fewer than 100 votes).
What we see here is a distribution that, despite variations in district sizes and the number of precincts in
each (varying between 53 to 3301, with an average of 1020), largely corresponds to the national second-
digit average of 4.081—or slightly lower than the 2BL prediction of 4.187. Although such a difference,
given the large number of precincts (n5 85,526), might be cause for suspicion, it is unlikely to convince
anyone that much was amiss in Russia’s 008 vote. Indeed, were we to have no other information about
Russia and no other forensic evidence, we would most likely be unwilling to reject the hypothesis that its
2008 vote was wholly free, fair, and absent significant fraud.
However, looking at things more closely, notice that Fig. 2 revels the great variety of numbers that
a second-digit calculation generates, which is consistent with the supposition that a national average dis-
guises considerable variation in the quality and legitimacy of vote counts. Thus, we must ask whether the
components of this distribution match what we know about the country’s political geography. And it is
here that Benford’s second-digit ‘‘law’’ falls woefully short with both Type 1 and Type 2 errors. Specif-
ically, supposewe rank order the regions by the extent to which they depart from the 2BL number of 4.187.
In this case, the ranks of the ‘‘usual suspects’’ are as follows:
8th Ingueshetia (mean 5 3.795)
8Putin was credited with 71.31% of the vote in 2004 versus Medvedev’s 71.25% in 2008.
9Although turnover characterizes governments in Chechnya and Ingushetia owing to assassinations and the Kremlin’s search for
leaders loyal to Moscow, M. Shaymiyev has led Tatarstan since 1991, M. Rakhimov has held the position of president of Bashkorto-
stan since 1993, M. Merkushkin has held the same post in Moldovia since 1995, and recent Putin appointee M. Aliyev heads Dage-
stan after replacing M. Magomedov, who ruled from 1982 to 2006.
10Despite its attempt at diplomatic language, the OSCE’s official report on the 2004 election (ODIHR June 2, 2004), singled out
Dagestan, Mordovia, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, Tatarstan, and Chechnya in an Appendix titled ‘‘Sample of Implausible Turnout
and Result Figures.’’
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17th Tatarstan (mean 5 3.890)
20th Chechnya (mean 5 3.920)
39th Karachaevo-Cherkassia (mean 5 4.021)
40th Mordova (mean 5 4.346)
47th Dagestan (mean 5 4.044)
71st Bashkortostan (mean 5 4.219).
Although Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Tatarstan’s means fall significantly below 4.187, to find that
Bashkortostan is afforded a clean bill of health substantiates 2BL as an unreliable forensic tool. More
impressive still from the perspective of undermining 2BL’s value is the list of regions that rank highest
in the magnitude of their departure from 4.187. Those regions are from 1st to 6th:
Khanti–Mansi (mean 5 3.135)
St. Petersburg (mean 5 3.635)
Archangel oblast (mean 5 3.684)
Yamalo-Nenetz oblast (mean 5 4.683)
Kemerovskaya oblast (mean 5 3.754)
Omsk oblast (mean 5 3.765).
One might argue that the inclusion of St Petersburg on this list should not be deemed incredible since it is
Putin’s home district (although we can argue that St. Petersburg is an unlikely locus of significant fraud).
But consider the fact that for the seven ‘‘usual suspects,’’ Medvedev’s average vote was 89.4% (with an
average turnout of 90.9%) whereas for the six regions that yield the greatest deviation from 2BL, Med-
vedvev’s vote averaged slightly less than 70% (with an average turnout of approximately 77%). Thus,
were we to take the calculation of second-digit means at face value, we might conclude that there
was fraud, but in the form of millions of ballots for Medvedev that were wholly discarded or given
to opposing candidates. If there is a hypothesis in political science to which we can assign a zero prior,
it is that one.
7 Conclusions
Our earlier critique of Sobyanin’s application of the log-rank model to elections is not based on its
performance in Russia’s 1993 Constitutional referendum. Indeed, we might say that this application
illustrates a ‘‘Type 3’’ error—corroborating the correct hypothesis for the wrong reasons. Although there
surely was some fraud in the 1993 vote (Yeltsin’s tailor-made constitution could not be ratified unless
turnout exceeded 50% and there is evidence to suggest that votes were manufactured in various regions
to satisfy that requirement), the log-rank model was rejected as a forensic tool for theoretical reasons.
Conversely, the model gained acceptance in a different context because Ijiri and Simon (1977) offered
a theoretical rational for it that fit that context. Both manifestations of the log-rank model, then, illustrate
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that absent a theoretical basis for assuming otherwise, generalized statements of empirical relationships
that apply in one context cannot be transported to other contexts willy-nilly. With respect to Benford’s
Law, we know some of the conditions that, if satisfied, yield numbers in accordancewith it, but just as there
is no basis for supposing that the Ijiri-Simon model of firm size or an empirical relationship that holds for
insects and city sizes applies to parties, candidates or anything else political, there is no reason to suppose
a priori that the conditions sufficient to occasion digits matching 2BL necessarily hold any meaning for
elections. Indeed, if Ijiri and Simon’s model provides any guidance—and we note again that they focus on
a specific process with specific assumptions and that their model does not predict a strictly linear relation-
ship between log and rank, but rather a slightly convex one—it, in combination with what we know about
the stochastic processes sufficient to yield digits in conformity with Benford’s Law, is that the Law is
not universally applicable magic box into which we plug election statistics and out of which comes an
assessment of an election’s legitimacy. This is not to say it is fruitless to search for special electoral
contexts in which 2BL has some relevance, but our analysis suggests that the data required to validate
that relevance must be richer than simple election returns.
We can illustrate what we mean here with another indicator proposed by Sobyanin that, unlike the
log-rank model, has been refined to become a valuable forensic tool. Briefly, Sobyanin noted that,
absent fraud in the form of artificially inflated turnout, the relationship in otherwise homogeneous data
between turnout, T, and a candidate’s share of the eligible electorate, V/E, should match the candidate’s
overall share of the vote. Thus, if we estimate V/E 5 a 1bT, then absent fraud and unobserved variables
that correlate with both T and V, a should approximately equal 0 and b should approximate the candidate’s
percentage of the counted vote. If, though, a candidate’s vote share is padded by adding ballots in
otherwise low turnout districts, estimates of a will turn negative and estimates of b increase until, in
extreme cases, it exceeds 1.0 (e.g., upwards of 1.6 in places like Russia’s Tatarstan). The operant clause
here, though, is ‘‘in otherwise homogeneous data’’ since this indicator is intended to detect the
heterogeneity introduced by fraud. Any preexisting heterogeneity can only distort our conclusions
and it is essential that we control for those other parameters that might intervene between turnout
and candidate preference. Knowing what these things might be—regional loyalties, ethnic identities,
or differences in voting patterns between urban and rural voters—is where substantive expertise enters
and belies a blind application of this indicator.
To illustrate things further, we note that if, after separating Republican from Democratic precincts
(since these subsets are on average demographically distinct), we apply Sobyanin’s second indicator
to data from Cuyahoga (Cleveland) or Franklin (Columbus) counties Ohio, nothing hinting at fraud
appears. But if we do the same for Hamilton County (Cincinnati), it would seem that significant fraud
has occurred in every presidential election beginning with 1992 (Myagkov et al. 2009, see especially
257–65). It is unreasonable to suppose, though, that fraud of the magnitude suggested by a blind appli-
cation of this indicator has gone unnoticed through five presidential elections. But there is an innocuous
explanation—the Republican precincts in Cincinnati itself that are demographically distinct from those in
the suburbs—districts that vote Republican by slim margins and with considerably lower rates of turnout
than other districts. Thus, merely separating precincts by party preference is a poor control for demo-
graphic heterogeneity in the country and results in a false signal of fraud (for a similar example in Taiwan
owing to military districts and districts with heavy concentrations of ‘‘aboriginal populations’’ see Chaing
and Ordeshook 2009).
To suppose that Benford’s Law or any proposed indicator can avoid these methodological
complexities is unwarranted. A valid analysis, regardless of the forensic tool proposed, must include
a model that either specifies the generalized impact of parameters such as district magnitude,
competitiveness, and regional clustering of support or it must give us sound theoretical arguments
for supposing that those parameters will not impact our conclusions. Thus, even if there are those
who reject the inference drawn from our analysis—that Benford’s Law is irrelevant to assessing an
election’s conformity with good democratic practice and that effort should be directed elsewhere in
the search for forensic indicators—we cannot escape the conclusion that any future development of that
Law’s application to elections must necessarily identify likely intervening variables with their impact on
digit distributions adjusted in a theoretically proscribed way.
260 Joseph Deckert et al.
 at California Institute of Technology on N
ovem
ber 7, 2011
http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Table A1 Simulation results for constant district sizes
Election
Second-digit mean
for C1 (p-values
in parentheses, H0:
l 5 4.187)
Second-digit mean
for C2 (p-values
in parentheses, H0:
l 5 4.187)
Second-digit mean
for C1 post-fraud
Second-digit mean
for C2 post-fraud
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C2
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
% Of the
vote for
C1
% Of the
vote
for C2
Precinct
size
1 4.501 (.0005275) 4.48 (.001759) 4.509 (.0003855) 4.467 (.002334) .950 .921 52 48 10k
2 4.505 (.0004939) 4.454 (.004035) 4.534 (.0001347) 4.598 (3.516  10206) .821 .260 52 48 10k
3 4.345 (.07584) 4.427 (.007384) 4.663 (5.994  10208) 4.597 (9.786  10206) .011 .186 52 48 10k
4 4.395 (.0233) 4.239 (.5585) 4.455 (.002817) 4.522 (.0002463) .639 .026 52 48 10k
5 4.409 (.01513) 4.36 (.05706) 4.314 (.1542) 4.621 (3.637  10206) .456 .045 52 48 10k
6 4.426 (.009347) 4.399 (.01824) 4.504 (.0006151) 4.67 (8.28  10208) .549 .032 52 48 1k
7 4.468 (.001683) 4.513 (.0005492) 4.522 (.0003325) 4.481 (.001503) .675 .808 52 48 1k
8 4.567 (2.341  10205) 4.3 (.2054) 4.624 (9.857  10207) 4.738 (2.759  10209) .651 .001 52 48 1k
9 4.435 (.006399) 4.55 (7.577  10205) 4.581 (1.476  10205) 4.538 (.0001136) .255 .926 52 48 1k
10 4.513 (.0003388) 4.529 (.00017) 4.516 (.0002704) 4.606 (3.939 10206) .981 .547 52 48 1k
11 4.363 (.06022) 4.553 (4.749  10205) 4.411 (.01325) 4.433 (.007951) .712 .351 52 48 20k
12 4.515 (.0002779) 4.446 (.005051) 4.564 (2.762  10205) 4.469 (.002445) .699 .860 52 48 20k
13 4.514 (.0003142) 4.593 (8.716  10206) 4.351 (.0773) 4.499 (.0005678) .208 .463 52 48 20k
14 4.472 (.001797) 4.294 (.2342) 4.549 (.0001021) 4.387 (.02591) .554 .464 52 48 20k
15 4.564 (3.327  10205) 4.561 (4.29  10205) 4.587 (1.008  10205) 4.579 (1.836  10205) .857 .889 52 48 20k
16 4.508 (.0003417) 4.392 (.02726) 4.494 (.0005536) 4.665 (1.519  10207) .911 .035 55 45 10k
17 4.38038 (.03311) 4.586587 (1.175  10205) 4.419419 (.008734) 4.427427 (.00884) .762 .217 55 45 10k
18 4.414 (.01274) 4.648 (5.644  10207) 4.591 (1.499  10205) 4.545 (6.305  10205) .173 .420 55 45 10k
19 4.468 (.001781) 4.55 (6.68  10205) 4.569 (1.488  10205) 4.532 (.0001654) .421 .889 55 45 10k
20 4.277277 (.3148) 4.507508 (.0003764) 4.660661 (2.032  10207) 4.643644 (6.844  10207) .003 .288 55 45 10k
21 4.665666 (1.847  10207) 4.567568 (3.506  10205) 4.491491 (.0008018) 4.623624 (1.378  10206) .175 .662 55 45 10k
22 4.378 (.03648) 4.581 (1.980  10205) 4.504 (.0006124) 4.722 (4.023  10209) .331 .273 55 45 1k
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Table A1 (continued)
Election
Second-digit mean
for C1 (p-values
in parentheses, H0:
l 5 4.187)
Second-digit mean
for C2 (p-values
in parentheses, H0:
l 5 4.187)
Second-digit mean
for C1 post-fraud
Second-digit mean
for C2 post-fraud
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C2
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
% Of the
vote for
C1
% Of the
vote
for C2
Precinct
size
23 4.655656 (1.42  10207) 4.515516 (.0003743) 4.798799 (4.37  10211) 4.634635 (1.001  10206) .259 .353 55 45 1k
24 4.617 (2.234  10206) 4.387 (.02699) 4.468 (.002137) 4.558 (5.05  10205) .246 .183 55 45 1k
25 4.407 (.01897) 4.557 (4.847  10205) 4.539 (.0001007) 4.544 (7.182  10205) .310 .919 55 45 1k
26 4.541542 (9.315  10205) 4.573574 (3.161  10205) 4.647648 (2.663  10207) 4.514515 (.0002764) .403 .647 55 45 1k
27 4.428428 (.008399) 4.414414 (.01163) 4.583584 (1.753  10205) 4.617618 (2.035  10206) .231 .111 55 45 1k
28 4.633 (8.14  10207) 4.579 (1.412  10205) 4.482 (.000954) 4.327 (.1272) .233 .050 55 45 20k
29 4.620621 (2.712  10206) 4.592593 (7.71  10206) 4.48048 (.001549) 4.381381 (.03417) .286 .101 55 45 20k
30 4.603 (5.952  10206) 4.617 (1.614  10206) 4.488 (.0009504) 4.321 (.1338) .372 .019 55 45 20k
31 4.563 (3.897  10205) 4.433 (.005638) 4.382 (.02903) 4.512 (.0003035) .156 .531 55 45 20k
32 4.738739 (2.632  10209) 4.557558 (4.978  10205) 4.421421 (.01077) 4.540541 (8.29  10205) .015 .894 55 45 20k
33 4.456456 (.003211) 4.598599 (9.859  10206) 4.495495 (.0005469) 4.516517 (.0002988) .759 .527 55 45 20k
34 4.574 (4.458  10205) 4.63 (2.348  10207) 4.457 (.00348) 4.122 (.4462) .007 .000 66 34 10k
35 4.364 (.05588) 4.579 (7.138  10206) 4.431 (.007285) 4.191 (.9628) .781 .016 66 34 10k
36 4.629 (1.252  10206) 4.64 (2.509  10207) 4.617 (3.921  10206) 4.151 (.6736) .252 .000 66 34 10k
37 4.836837 (1.029  10212) 4.781782 (9.35  10212) 4.558559 (6.631  10205) 4.011011 (.03234) .031 .000 66 34 10k
38 4.575576 (2.582  10205) 4.702703 (5.587  10209) 4.465465 (.002793) 4.144144 (.6091) .400 .000 66 34 10k
39 4.652653 (1.239  10207) 4.703704 (6.548  10209) 4.494494 (.0007267) 4.062062 (.1382) .209 .000 66 34 10k
40 4.659 (8.397  10208) 4.632 (6.96  10207) 4.638 (1.183  10206) 4.144 (.6069) .225 .000 66 34 1k
41 4.457 (.003266) 4.591 (3.329  10206) 4.45 (.004156) 4.053 (.1168) .519 .000 66 34 1k
42 4.546 (.0001129) 4.696 (5.164  10209) 4.478 (.002178) 4.118 (.3996) .561 .000 66 34 1k
43 4.402402 (.0206) 4.60961 (2.407  10206) 4.439439 (.00522) 4.153153 (.6892) .775 .000 66 34 1k
44 4.378378 (.0334) 4.478478 (.0009649) 4.408408 (.01654) 4.07007 (.1654) .816 .001 66 34 1k
45 4.715716 (3.159  10209) 4.578579 (1.133  10205) 4.543544 (9.907  10205) 4.054054 (.1189) .176 .000 66 34 1k
46 4.437 (.005334) 4.408 (.01554) 4.242 (.5394) 4.35 (.07605) .741 .098 66 34 20k
47 4.553 (4.77  10205) 4.625 (1.424  10206) 4.468 (.001930) 4.491 (.0006196) .673 .349 66 34 20k
48 4.545 (.0001375) 4.502 (.0005964) 4.276 (.3304) 4.373 (.04544) .783 .802 66 34 20k
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Table A1 (continued)
Election
Second-digit mean
for C1 (p-values
in parentheses, H0:
l 5 4.187)
Second-digit mean
for C2 (p-values
in parentheses, H0:
l 5 4.187)
Second-digit mean
for C1 post-fraud
Second-digit mean
for C2 post-fraud
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C2
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
% Of the
vote for
C1
% Of the
vote
for C2
Precinct
size
49 4.477477 (.001300) 4.550551 (5.063  10205) 4.37037 (.05199) 4.57958 (1.554  10205) .411 .819 66 34 20k
50 4.631632 (9.491  10207) 4.484484 (.0007496) 4.234234 (.6293) 4.484484 (.001128) .003 .000 66 34 20k
51 4.495495 (.0007575) 4.498498 (.0007485) 4.277277 (.329) 4.375375 (.03263) .093 .334 66 34 20k
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Table A2 Simulation results for exponentially distributed district sizes
Election
Simulation
Second-digit mean
for C1 (p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C2
(p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C1
post-fraud
Second-digit
mean for C2
post-fraud
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
% Of the vote
for C1
% Of the vote
for C2
Mean
precinct size
1 4.375 (.03723) 4.494 (.0007654) 4.315 (.1624) 4.265 (.3766) .641 .071 52 48 10k
2 4.597 (4.914  10206) 4.421 (.0096) 4.499 (.0006681) 4.099 (.3190) .443 .011 52 48 10k
3 4.463 (.002034) 4.245 (.5148) 4.562 (5.46  10205) 4.224 (.6817) .441 .868 52 48 10k
4 4.585 (1.251  10205) 4.397 (.01931) 4.475 (.001429) 4.269 (.3651) .389 .315 52 48 10k
5 4.436 (.005637) 4.308 (.1861) 4.319 (.1428) 4.331 (.1054) .357 .857 52 48 10k
6 4.501 (.0005242) 4.236 (.5849) 4.579 (1.971  10205) 4.155 (.7204) .544 .522 52 48 10k
7 4.415 (.01245) 4.238 (.5732) 4.436 (.006641) 4.456 (.002677) .871 .087 52 48 10k
8 4.438 (.005221) 4.417 (.01064) 4.559 (5.909  10205) 4.074 (.2037) .347 .007 52 48 10k
9 4.328 (.1196) 4.312 (.1693) 4.523 (.0002332) 4.151 (.6845) .129 .205 52 48 10k
10 4.302 (.1982) 4.264 (.383) 4.507 (.000254) 4.073 (.2028) .101 .129 52 48 10k
11 4.451 (.003308) 4.061 (.1574) 4.496 (.000615) 4.186 (.991) .723 .320 52 48 1k
12 4.238 (.5682) 4.302 (.1917) 4.429 (.006254) 4.102 (.3475) .129 .113 52 48 1k
13 4.3 (.202) 4.425 (.009896) 4.468 (.001753) 4.173 (.8743) .182 .049 52 48 1k
14 4.243 (.5294) 4.424 (.007323) 4.399 (.01635) 4.221 (.7061) .213 .108 52 48 1k
15 4.458 (.002585) 4.331 (.1051) 4.491 (.000796) 4.062 (.1631) .796 .033 52 48 1k
16 4.185 (.9822) 4.325 (.1291) 4.481 (.001105) 4.063 (.1706) .020 .041 52 48 1k
17 4.44 (.006702) 4.347 (.07146) 4.319 (.1587) 4.087 (.2491) .359 .036 52 48 1k
18 4.276 (.3230) 4.321 (.1363) 4.405 (.01566) 4.159 (.754) .311 .201 52 48 1k
19 4.462 (.002603) 4.215 (.7561) 4.394 (.02297) 4.287 (.2729) .597 .574 52 48 1k
20 4.333 (.1057) 4.365 (.04856) 4.402 (.01725) 4.207 (.8205) .588 .210 52 48 1k
21 4206 (.835) 4.416 (.01250) 4.306 (.1962) 4.399 (.01963) .440 .895 52 48 20k
22 4.348 (.07895) 4.528 (.0001858) 4.422 (.009263) 4.544 (8.018  10205) .565 .901 52 48 20k
23 4.444 (.004794) 4.321 (.1436) 4.313 (.1686) 4.282 (.3047) .310 .764 52 48 20k
24 4.369 (.04315) 4.413 (.01175) 4.287 (.2799) 4.256 (.4331) .525 .211 52 48 20k
25 4.287 (.2827) 4.41 (.01646) 4.343 (.08714) 4.288 (.2668) .667 .348 52 48 20k
26 4.533 (.0001920) 4.322 (.1333) 4.5 (.0007578) 4.099 (.3305) .801 .080 55 45 10k
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Table A2 (continued)
Election
Simulation
Second-digit mean
for C1 (p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C2
(p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C1
post-fraud
Second-digit
mean for C2
post-fraud
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
% Of the vote
for C1
% Of the vote
for C2
Mean
precinct size
27 4.5 (.0006922) 4.31 (.1744) 4.557 (4.726  10205) 4.134 (.5558) .659 .168 55 45 10k
28 4.418 (.00888) 4.444 (.003754) 4.597 (7.534  10206) 4.108 (.3726) .158 .007 55 45 10k
29 4.292 (.2421) 4.397 (.01780) 4.6 (4.319  10206) 4.162 (.7761) .015 .060 55 45 10k
30 4.355 (.06605) 4.277 (.3167) 4.18 (.9398) 4.355 (.06699) .179 .543 55 45 20k
31 4.261 (.4044) 4.28 (.3071) 4.407 (.01452) 4.25 (.4804) .248 .814 55 45 20k
32 4.528 (.0002149) 4.546 (7.524  10205) 4.446 (.004772) 4.396 (.02109) .527 .241 55 45 20k
33 4.268 (.3762) 4.347 (.07731) 4.446 (.004732) 4.4 (.02097) .169 .682 55 45 20k
34 4.224 (.6914) 4.348 (.07841) 4.294 (.2396) 4.422 (.01036) .591 .567 55 45 20k
35 4.347 (.07858) 4.178 (.9216) 4.288 (.2654) 4.174 (.8863) .646 .975 56 44 10k
36 4.546 (7.449  10205) 4.367 (.04757) 4.593 (1.117  10205) 4.16 (.7591) .715 .102 56 44 10k
37 4.568 (3.246  10205) 4.258 (.4284) 4.353 (.06979) 4.076 (.2036) .096 .146 56 44 10k
38 4.324 (.1342) 4.266 (.3751) 4.542 (7.24  10205) 4.025 (.07301) .088 .057 57 42 10k
39 4.571 (2.237  10205) 4.33 (.1237) 4.402 (.01936) 4.265 (.375) .189 .611 57 42 10k
40 4.366 (.04677) 4.347 (.07172) 4.719 (3.390  10209) 4.214 (.756) .005 .284 57 42 10k
41 4.454 (.003739) 4.288 (.2683) 4.474 (.001390) 4.2 (.8845) .876 .491 57 42 10k
42 4.366 (.04909) 4.329 (.1111) 4.448 (.003855) 4.089 (.2616) .522 .054 57 42 10k
43 4.609 (5.349  10206) 4.345 (.07207) 4.478 (.001054) 3.965 (.01241) .306 .002 57 42 10k
44 4.458 (.002898) 4.165 (.8045) 4.579 (1.562  10205) 4.187 (1.00) .345 .861 57 42 10k
45 4.423 (.01027) 4.304 (.1975) 4.595 (7.079  10206) 4.306 (.1846) .182 .987 57 43 10k
46 4.446 (.004842) 4.211 (.786) 4.447 (.004746) 3.969 (.01261) .994 .051 57 42 1k
47 4.336 (.1049) 4.078 (.2195) 4.255 (.4474) 4.012 (.05682) .528 .605 57 42 1k
48 4.377 (.03293) 4.316 (.1474) 4.527 (.0001435) 4.144 (.6239) .234 .169 57 42 1k
49 4.357 (.06095) 4.344 (.08281) 4.33 (.1199) 4.068 (.1790) .834 .029 57 42 1k
50 4.548 (6.399  10205) 4.248 (.4991) 4.531 (.0001395) 4.009 (.03756) .894 .055 57 42 1k
51 4.624 (1.651  10206) 4.338 (.08835) 4.437 (.005437) 4.213 (.7717) .143 .321 57 42 1k
52 4.428 (.007625) 4.221 (.7091) 4.488 (.001098) 4.2 (.8825) .641 .868 57 42 1k
Continued
2
6
5
B
e
n
fo
rd
’s
L
a
w
a
n
d
th
e
D
e
te
c
tio
n
o
f
E
le
c
tio
n
F
ra
u
d
 at California Institute of Technology on November 7, 2011 http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from 
Table A2 (continued)
Election
Simulation
Second-digit mean
for C1 (p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C2
(p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C1
post-fraud
Second-digit
mean for C2
post-fraud
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
% Of the vote
for C1
% Of the vote
for C2
Mean
precinct size
53 4.341 (.08887) 4.162 (.7805) 4.532 (.0001005) 4.145 (.638) .131 .893 57 42 1k
54 4.457 (.002744) 4.172 (.8656) 4.549 (6.757  10205) 4.187 (1.00) .471 .906 57 42 1k
55 4.337 (.1011) 4.357 (.05251) 4.555 (4.540  10205) 4.149 (.6798) .089 .102 57 42 1k
56 4.475 (.00145) 4.144 (.6288) 4.552 (7.545  10205) 4.066 (.1774) .550 .537 57 42 1k
57 4.444 (.003567) 4.394 (.02015) 4.514 (.0003058) 3.968 (.01367) .579 .001 57 42 1k
58 4.523 (.0003052) 4.282 (.2786) 4.477 (.001416) 3.917 (.002229) .723 .003 57 42 1k
59 4.386 (.02808) 4.245 (.5188) 4.363 (.0551) 3.994 (.03192) .858 .048 57 42 1k
60 4.479 (.001822) 4.12 (.4518) 4.347 (.07485) 4.039 (.09256) .308 .517 57 42 1k
61 4.414 (.01213) 4.044 (.1114) 4.558 (7.675  10205) 3.946 (.006403) .268 .436 67 33 10k
62 4.56 (3.133  10205) 4.049 (.1196) 4.527 (.0002456) 4.105 (.3717) .797 .661 67 33 10k
63 4.558 (5.019  10205) 4.125 (.5021) 4.745 (1.445  10209) 4.051 (.1357) .147 .568 67 33 10k
64 4.585 (1.529  10205) 3.979 (.01998) 4.464 (.002669) 3.906 (.001334) .351 .559 67 33 10k
65 4.385 (.03358) 3.893 (.001100) 4.384 (.02601) 3.985 (.0229) .994 .466 67 33 10k
66 4.452 (.004241) 4.121 (.466) 4.435 (.007164) 3.976 (.01704) .896 .252 67 33 10k
67 4.471 (.002035) 4.109 (.3856) 4.398 (.02090) 3.996 (.03156) .573 .371 67 33 10k
68 4.582 (9.777  10206) 4.062 (.1726) 4.627 (1.874  10206) 3.921 (.002590) .725 .267 67 33 10k
69 4.441 (.00409) 4.021 (.06735) 4.405 (.01680) 3.968 (.01495) .776 .678 67 33 10k
70 4.383 (.02998) 4.066 (.1561) 4.577 (2.137  10205) 3.856 (.0001946) .131 .088 67 33 10k
71 4.531 (.0001346) 3.938 (.005614) 4.724 (3.6  10209) 3.973 (.01645) .129 .782 67 33 1k
72 4.288 (.2774) 4.02 (.06748) 4.312 (.1625) 3.985 (.024) .852 .784 67 33 1k
73 4.374 (.04327) 4.002 (.04144) 4.417 (.01071) 3.845 (.0001319) .739 .217 67 33 1k
74 4.519 (.0003204) 3.811 (2.245  10205) 4.45 (.004604) 3.951 (.008805) .597 .267 67 33 1k
75 4.632 (1.4  10206) 4.072 (.2013) 4.426 (.009122) 3.754 (1.098  10206) .112 .012 67 33 1k
76 4.517 (.0003017) 3.903 (.001606) 4.459 (.002817) 3.9 (.001564) .652 .981 67 33 1k
77 4.602 (9.836  10206) 4.039 (.1016) 4.462 (.002454) 4.014 (.05669) .282 .845 67 33 1k
78 4.463 (.002138) 4.067 (.1774) 4.569 (2.616  10205) 4.067 (.1836) .405 1.000 67 33 1k
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Table A2 (continued)
Election
Simulation
Second-digit mean
for C1 (p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C2
(p-values in
parentheses,
H0: l 5 4.187)
Second-digit
mean for C1
post-fraud
Second-digit
mean for C2
post-fraud
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
p-Value for
a change in
mean for C1
(H0: second-
digit mean is
the same
before an
after fraud)
% Of the vote
for C1
% Of the vote
for C2
Mean
precinct size
79 4.599 (7.299  10206) 3.964 (.01153) 4.552 (4.916  10205) 3.847 (.0001257) .713 .348 67 33 1k
80 4.554 (4.688  10205) 4.086 (.2577) 4.642 (4.5  10207) 3.896 (.001138) .488 .132 67 33 1k
81 4.272 (.3517) 4.321 (.1441) 4.2 (.8878) 4.28 (.3054) .579 .751 67 33 20k
82 4.142 (.6289) 4.323 (.1379) 4.199 (.8962) 4.296 (.2394) .663 .836 67 33 20k
83 4.242 (.5558) 4.342 (.08247) 4.251 (.5025) 4.357 (.06224) .946 .906 67 33 20k
84 4.148 (.6735) 4.518 (.0003087) 4.182 (.9576) 4.469 (.001536) .797 .701 67 33 20k
85 4.17 (.8573) 4.271 (.3499) 4.165 (.817) 4.378 (.03825) .970 .406 67 33 20k
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